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Sofar it has been shown that Phase III episodes almost always result initially
in a certain amount of liberalization, some rationalization, and a reduction in
both the bias and the variance of the trade and payments regime. Although
liberalization is not inevitable (as in Colombia in 1957 and 1962), it normally
occurs because premiums on import licenses are absorbed. This absorption
may result from the exchange rate change, or from using foreign credits to per-
mit import flows to increase, or from depressing the level of economic activity.
The initial liberalization can be virtually complete, as in Turkey in 1970, or of
relatively smaller magnitude, as in Ghana and India. Likewise, rationalization
can be extensive, as multiple formalities, taxes, and administrative agencies are
replaced with more-or-less streamlined procedures (as in Turkey in 1958), or
simplification may be limited. Reduction in bias and variance results both
from premium absorption and from the exchange rate change itself, which is
usually greater for exports than for imports and greater for those imports
previously most favored and exports most discriminated against.
In the longer run, whether these changes can be sustained depends largely
on how foreign exchange receipts behave. Although imports can be liberalized
in the short run by foreign borrowing or depressing the level of economic ac-
tivity, their continued liberalization is contingent upon allowing them to in-
crease at about the rate of growth of demand; that, in turn, depends upon the
ability of the country to finance the import bill. Generally the behavior of
foreign exchange receipts is closely associated with the behavior of export
earnings, although other factors have been significant in particular cir-
cumstances.
The primary focus of this chapter is on the determinants of export earn-
ings and other sources of foreign exchange in the intermediate and longer run.
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The intermediate term is defined as a period sufficiently long for foreign ex-
change receipts to respond to altered real export EERs, even when those rates
are not necessarily to continue indefinitely. Of particular importance in this
regard is the relative influence of the various components of the Phase III
packages. Those considerations are the subject of the first section of this
chapter. In the second section the ten countries' policies and experience are
weighed in order to assess the determinants of long-run growth of exports and
other foreign exchange earnings.
I. INTERMEDIATE-TERM RESPONSES
As already indicated, receipts from exports have been the major source of
growth in foreign exchange resources in almost all the countries covered by the
project. The behavior of export earnings in the periods surrounding Phase III
was the subject of careful analysis in each of the country studies, and these fin-
dings are summarized here. Tables 9-1 through 9-4 give data on PLD-EERs
and dollar values of exports for traditional and nontraditional exports for each
of the ten countries; these data are useful background for the findings of the
individual authors. It should be borne in mind that concern here is focused on
the behavior of exports in the period following devaluation. While no precise
time interval covers all cases, it usually starts immediately after devaluation
with inventory changes, continues into altered production patterns out of ex-
isting capacity in the six to eighteen months following devaluation, and may
even entail some alterations in productive capacity over the first two or three
years after devaluation.
Export Response in Individual Countries Following Phase III
BRAZIL
Fishlow believes that the 1957 Phase III did not initially generate any
change in exports because bias against exports was really unaltered. In 1958
and 1959, therefore, export earnings declined:
It was this precarious situation that led, for the first time in the post-war period,
to attention to the export rate and the need for increased foreign exchange
receipts.'
AINTERMEDIATE-TERM RESPONSES
The PLD-EER for traditional exports, which had been declining since 1950,
increased 43 percent from 1958—its low point—to 1959, and the nontradi-
tional export rate rose 22 percent.2 This reduced bias resulted in an increase in
the volume of exports and arrested the decline in export earnings that would
otherwise have resulted. Nonetheless, as can be seen from Tables 9-3 and
the decline in export earnings, which had continued since 1955, was finally
halted.
Following the 1961 Phase III the increase in the PLD-EER for both
traditional and nontraditional exports was short-lived. Fishlow reported an
immediate increase in both volume and value of exports from their 1960 levels,
but it did not continue, and Brazilian inflation reached its maximum rate in the
next several years. While there were periodic adjustments in the exchange rate,
they were not sufficient to maintain the real EERs at their levels of 1959 and
1960.
The aftermath of the Brazilian 1964 Phase III was entirely different from
the first two Phase III episodes, which were followed by only a relatively small
and temporary increase in the volume of exports in response to reduced bias of
the regime. Fishlow distinguishes between the events of 1964-1967, which can
be regarded as the intermediate term, and the 1968-1974 growth of exports,
which is considered a long-term response. From 1964 to 1966, nontraditional
exports rose from $500 million to $815 million, falling back a bit to $799
million in 1967. Traditional exports earnings remained stagnant, so that there
was an overall increase of 24 percent from 1964 to 1966.
Fishlow attributes much of the export improvement to the incentives pro-
vided by the domestic recession, rather than to the change in the real exchange
rates.3 While he regards the earlier reduction in bias as being a necessary condi-
tion for exporting, exports increased during the 1964-1967 period primarily
because the productive capacity was there and domestic demand was inade-
quate to absorb it. In the intermediate run, therefore, productive capacity was
shifted to supplying the export market, but entrepreneurs were not creating
new capacity for that purpose and exports began declining when domestic de-
mand picked up in 1967.
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The Chilean experience is one in which there was no long-term response:
)OSt-war period, all periods of liberalization terminated within six years largely because the
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Table 9-1.Indexes of PLD-EERs for Traditional Exports, Nine Countries,



































































































































































































































A higher index number
relative price is received
implies a higher price of foreign currency in real terms; i.e., a higher
by exporters for the same foreign price of the commodity. PLD-EERs
are not given in Hansen and Nashashibi, and Egypt is therefore excluded from statistical results
reported below.
Sources:
Brazil—The coffee export rate was taken from IMF, International Financial Statistics. It was
deflated by the wholesale price mdex. That index, on a 1965-1967 base, was provided for the
years 1954 to 1968 by Fishlow, and it was linked to the other years, where Line 63 of
International Financial Statistics was used.
Chile—DatafromBehrman. The mining PLD-EER, from Table A-8, Column 3-8 was used.
Colombia—Thecoffeeexport rate from International FinancialStatistics,deflated by Line 63B,
was used.
Ghana—The cocoa export rate from Leith, Table 11.8, was used.
lndia—Bhagwati and Srinivasan, Table 2-1, Column 8.
South Korea—Frank, Kim, and Westphal, Table 6-6. There is no separate traditional export rate
for South Korea.
Philippines—Baldwin, Table 5-2.




























n.a. = not available.











































1950 104 119 87 n.a. 97 43 n.a. 100 n.a.
1951 88 123 73 n.a. 84 44na. 89 n.a.
1952 79 135 84 n.a. 99 58na. 98 n.a.
1953 82 122 92
87
n.a. 102 68 n.a. 100 91
1954 79 89 n.a. 107 86 n.a. 108 93
1955 101 96 95 109 117 90 93 111 83
1956 90 117
123
113 109 107 97 97 108 75
1957 93 108 107 101 103 92 103 62
1958 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1959 122 114 113 102 97 98 116 98 84
1960 130 107 . 100 102 .92 100 114 102 85
1961 142 94 122 99 90 94 103 114 84
1962 143 93 140 97 93 96 94 124 80
1963 121 100 122 91 90 91 98 125 76
1964 147 94 108 83 85 88 108 120 83
1965 148 106 140 71 84 83 108 130 80
1966 123 115 116 64 101 84 108 130 77
1967 119 104 120 94 82 89 106 120 68
1968 121 103 131 82 86 98 106 117 70
1969 122 107 136 74 88 100 105 116 67
1970 112 n.a. 139 na. 83 102 109 152 92
1971 107 n.a. 143 na. 84 104 n.a. 146 79
1972 102 n.a. 146 na. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. na.
that expectations ever shifted enough so that a longer-term response might
have developed. Chile is one of the countries, therefore, where there was an
intermediate-term response but where nothing can be inferred about the long-
term responsiveness of exports to altered incentives.
While part of the reason for the behavior of foreign exchange earnings
was the fluctuation in copper prices on world markets, Behrman's analysis
points to the strong bias against exports as.a major factor. It did not change




Indicesof PLD-EERs for Nontraditional Exports, Nine Countries,
(1958 PLD-EER = 100)
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Note: See notes to Table 9-1.
Sources: Sources are the same as Table 9-1 with the following exceptions: Brazil—"Export rate
except for coffee" data supplied by Fishlow; Chile—Behrman, export EER, Table A-8, Column
31; Tables 2-9for 1950 to 1952 and 2-10 for later years (data are
PPP-PLD-EERs); lndia—Bhagwati and Srinivasan, Table 2-i, using the columns recommended
by them in note ito that table (varying with the height of subsidy).190 LONGER-TERM RESPONSE TO PHASE Ill
YearBrazilChile
Table 9-3.Value of Traditional Exports, Nine Countries, 1954-1972
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32 per cent fror
n.a. = not available.
Note: InternationalFinancial Statistics givesthe exportvalueforindividual commoditiesin
local currency units for Egypt,Ghana, India, Israel,andTurkey(after 1965).For yearsin
which the exchangerate was unchanged, conversion todollarswas simple, as the exchange rate
atwhich thetransactions were recorded was thesame forallcommodities. Thelocal currency
value of traditional exports was therefore calculated asafraction of the total local currency
valueof exports, and the resulting fraction was then multiplied by the dollar value of exports.
Onlyifthe exchange ratesat which dollar proceeds were recorded differed between
commodities would there be any resulting error in the estimate.
Sources: The data were taken from IMF, International Financial Statistics. In order to obtain.
estimates on a comparable basis across countries, commodities listed separately in the export
statistics on the country pages were taken as traditional. The commodities so listed for each
countryareasfollows:Brazil—cacao,coffee,and cotton; Chile—copper and nitrate;
Columbia—coffee and petroleum; Egypt—cotton; Ghana—cacao; India—jute textiles and tea;
Israel—diamonds and citrus fruit; South Korea—none; Philippines—coconut products, sugar, and
wood; Turkey—chrome, cotton, hazelnuts, and tobacco.
It is important to emphasize again that this lackluster export performance in part
reflects the bias against exports in the trade regimes. Export pessimism, thus,
somewhat ironically led to policies that resulted in lower exports than otherwise
would have occurred.4
Nontraditional exports were much more sensitive to real exchange rates than
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Table 9-4.Value of Nontraditional Exports,TenCountries, 1954-1972
(millions of U.S. dollars)
South
YearBrazilChileColombiaEgyptGhanaIndiaIsraelKoreaPhilippinesTurkey
1954256n.a. 31 88 56 65240 24 95 89
1955357n.a. 34 110 60 76640 18 100 103
1956299n.a. 55 124 78 769 39 25 128 115
1957432n.a. 49 136 86 901 55 22 130 98
1958441na. 41 161 88 740 55 17 126 82
1959454na. 38 144 93 83680 20 151 137
1960441118 52 181 109 836103 33 157 156
1961537133 59 184 99 850127 41 151 149
1962435137 71 194 103 827134 55 157 158
1963509138 67 243 831041152 87 186 177
1964500195 79 271 1021159171 119 204 175
1965763174 107 269 1031131191 175 206 202
1966815161 109 275 951061220 250 211 192
1967799178 127 286 1171065252 320 253 183
1968929189 171 345 1241280295 455 261 182
19691197 78 207 444 851407352623 316 215
19701568322 210 421 1391606410 835 409 328
19711932n.a. 235 387 13015254981068 435 292
19722754na. 282 456na.18635901624 494 481
n.a.not available.
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.
traditional exports as given in Table 9-3.
Nontraditional exports are total exports less
adopted for nontraditional exports really only partially offset the bias against
them.' Because of this, dependence on traditional exports increased over the
post-World War II period, despite the fact that an avowed objective of the
regime was to reduce dependence on that class of commodities.6
Behrman estimated response functions for exports with respect to both
real exchange rates and also the standard deviation of those real rates, which
he took as a proxy for the uncertainty surrounding the real return to exporting.
He found significant export responses both to price changes and to reducing
uncertainty. For example, the elasticity of exports with respect to the exchange
rate was estimated to be 2.9 for industry, 0.8 for small- and medium-scale min-
ing, 0.5foragriculture, and 0.3 for large-scale mining.7 He calculated that
"the foregoing elasticities and the 63 per cent drop in the overall PLD-EER
between 1947 and 1972, for example, imply complete elimination of exports
from industry; and drops of 50 per cent from small- and medium-scale mining;
32 per cent from agriculture; and 19 per cent from large-scale mining."8 Every192 LONGER-TERM RESPONSE TO PHASE Ill
export sector except small- and medium-scale mining also responsed to reduc-
ing the standard deviation of the real exchange rate. In general, however, the
magnitude of those responses was somewhat smaller than that for the ex-
change rate itself.9
All three Chilean liberalizations failed because of the lack of increased
foreign exchange earnings. Behrman attributed this outcome largely to the fact
that liberalization efforts were undertaken with a "below-equilibrium and
often declining PLD-EER."° While exogenous events might have influenced
foreign exchange earnings adversely anyway, there was no chance for sustain-
ed liberalization in Chile because of the bias against exports that resulted from
the low real export exchange rates.
COLOMBIA
Coffee has historically dominated Colombia's exports. Any analysis of
the behavior of exports in the postwar period must separate the behavior of
traditional exports (coffee and petroleum) from that of "minor exports,"
which are themselves divided into two groups: "BCST" (bananas, cotton,
sugar and tobacco) and others. DIaz took the behavior of traditional exports
as given and did not analyze it in detaiL Fluctuations in the world price of cof-
fee and domestic political considerations which determined producer prices are
of such great importance that completely separate analyses would have been
required.
Over the period 1954-1956, minor exports averaged $40 million, while
traditional exports averaged $572 million; for the 1969-1971 period, minor ex-
ports averaged $217 million and traditional exports, $459 million. Thus, total
export earnings had increased barely by 10 percent, but that was accomplished
by a rapid expansion of the minor exports, which was more than sufficient to
offset the decline in traditional exports.
Minor exports were generally encouraged throughout the period, and the
Phase Ills were an occasion for exchange rate unification. Unlike devaluations
in most countries, Phase HI episodes in Colombia have resulted in declines in
the real export rate for minor exports. Prior to 1967 the real exchange rate ap-
plicable to minor exports declined from the preceding year in every year
following a devaluation.
Although it was not possible to evaluate the export response to Phase III
episodes per Se, Dfaz did estimate supply functions for total minor exports,
and for BCST and non-BCST exports separately. His results are reproduced in
Table 9-5. His dependent variable and first independent variable—the change
in the real exchange rate—are both measured in percentages. The coefficients
of the exchange rate change variables can therefore be interpreted as supply
elasticities;'2 their values range from 0.59 to 1.13. Diaz's estimates yield more
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Regression Exchangeof Exchange Change in
NumberConstant Rate Rate BCSTa Output
Total Dollar Value of Recorded Minor Exports, 1955-1972:
(1) 19.92 0.81 —1.85
(3.34) (2.50) (2.16)
0.364.20 2.04
(2) 14.40 0.87 —1.48 0.53
(6.44) (2.84) (1.78) (1.73)
0.474.18 2.01
Dollar Value of BCST Exports, 195 5-1970:
(3) —9.25 1.13 0.70 1.91
(0.74) (2.54) (0.49) (3.63)
0.61 6.23 2.74
Dollar Value of NonBCST Recorded Minor Exports, 1955-1970:
(4) 25.48 0.59 2.37
(2.82) (1.38) (1.93)
0.25 2.19 1.73
Note: For method, see Di'az, pp. 33 ff. The first two regressions have 18 observations, the last
two only 16, owing to lack of up-to-date customs data. Except for the instability index, all
values are expressed as year-to-year percentage changes. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
Source: D(az, Table 2-13.
=bananas,cotton, sugar, and tobacco.
bR2coefficient of multiple determination.
separately. It is interesting that he, like Behrman, finds the variance of the ex-
change rate to be negatively related to minor export earnings. This finding was
reinforced when Diaz ran the same sort of regression on quarterly data, in
which variance was much larger.'3 As is evident from Diaz's results, not all of
the increases in minor exports could be attributed to exchange rate changes,
and he considers that other policies promoting these exports were of great
long-term importance.
EGYPT
Because of the nationalization of Egyptian trade, few inferences can be
drawn about the results of Phase III from the Egyptian experience. Hansen
and Nashashibi believe that Egyptian exports of agricultural commodities were
competitive both before and after the Egyptian devaluation in 1962, and they
regard the exchange rate as far too overvalued to have encouraged manufac-
tured exports in either period.194 LONGER-TERM RESPONSE TO PHASE III
GHANA
Receipts from cocoa, which account for roughly 60 percent of Ghana's
total export earnings, rose in the several years after the 1967 devaluation, but
the rise was attributable to favorable world prices rather than to a supply
response. Indeed, Leith notes that estimates of the long-run elasticity of supply
range frOm 0.71 to 1.0, and that the PLD-EER for cocoa, after holding
relatively stable for a time, fell sharply with the inflation in 1965. It stabilized
after 1967 at a rate above that of 1966 but below earlier years. New plantings
of cocoa stopped in 1964/65 and had not been resumed at the time Leith was
writing.'5
Leith estimated the responsiveness of the noncocoa exports to fluctua-
tions in the real EER. He had only six observations and yet found a very close
relationship, with an estimated elasticity of export earnings from noncocoa ex-
ports of 0.43. He concluded that the decline in the real exchange rate resulted
in "a serious deterioration" of export earnings.'6 Although his estimating
equation predicts well the response to the 1967 devaluation, there is a lag.
Leith attributes this to the time taken to alter expectations and notes that the
real exchange rate had, by 1969, fallen to a lower level than in 1964. So
Ghana's poor export performance is apparently largely the result of overvalua-
tion of the exchange rate.'7
INDIA
Bhagwati and Srinivasan examined the various factors that, a priori,
would have been expected to affect exports in the intermediate run after
devaluation. There were both positive and negative effects, and their relative
importance differed among commodities. Factors tending to increase exports
were: (1) the devaluation presumably encouraged new exports that had not
earlier benefited from export subsidy schemes; (2) liberalization improved
availability of imports to new industries that were dependent on imported in-
puts, thus allowing the use of excess capacity and inducing a shift in the supply
of exports; and (3) export subsidies were reintroduced within six months
following the devaluation. Factors tending to reduce export earnings included:
(1) the fact that net devaluation was very small for traditional commodities on
which export duties were imposed at the time of devaluation; (2) the initial
removal of export subsidies; and (3) the increased cost of imports, which
might have raised the cost to potential new export industries. One might also
expect that recorded exports would have fallen because the removal of sub-
sidies reduced the incentive for faked invoicing.
The authors conclude that, on balance, there was no reason to expect any
in the export performance of traditional commodities but that
there could have been some improvement in newer export items. The Indian
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output sharply and thus should have adversely affected traditional exports,
while excess capacity resulting from slack domestic demand would have im-
proved the relative profitability of exporting nontraditional items. Detailed
analysis of the actual performance of individual export commodities fairly
well confirms the a priori expectations: there was a significant response for
steel, engineering goods, and, to a lesser extent, chemicals,'8 while traditional
exports declined after 1967. India had reverted to Phase II by 1968/69, with
PLD-EERs declining thereafter. Thus the Indian case represents yet another
where there was no opportunity for a longer-term response.
ISRAEL
Israel's exports grew at a higher annual rate in the three years after the
1952 devaluation than in any period of comparable duration since. Michaely
believes that this rapid growth was the result of the sharp increase in the real
export exchange rate. This substantial increase was accompanied by liberaliza-
tion of the regime and a reduction in bias, both contributing to the growth in
exports.
In contrast, the 1962 devaluation was preceded by a 6 percent decline in
the PPP-PLD-EER in 1961; the rate then rose 2.7 percent in 1962, only to fall
by 4.9 percent in 1963, with further drops in each of the subsequent two
years.'9 While exports grew at a rapid rate in the years following the 1962
devaluation, their average growth was rio higher than in earlier or later years.
The chief lesson from that episode seems to be that devaluation does not
necessarily increase the incentive to export, especially when net devaluation of
the export exchange rate is less than gross and when the devaluation is follow-
ed by inflation.
Michaely relied upon a study by Halevi to estimate the importance of the
real export exchange rate in affecting exports. His conclusions, based on the
Halevi study, were that:
It appears that the supply elasticity of exports is substantial, and probably
even high. This impression is strengthened by the realization that these estimates
must, for a number of reasons, be biased downward. It should be noted, first,
that the estimates exclude the first half of the 1950's, when the exchange-rate
changes were not only at their strongest but appear from my data to have had
relatively the strongest impact: as has been argued before, slight variations in the
exchange rate would result in lower estimates of elasticities (of supply or demand)
than major price changes, because of errors of measurement. ... Noless impor-
tant is the time lag involved in the response of quantity to price.... Thus,Halevi
finds a very high elasticity of supply (roughLy, 2) of industrial exports in relation
to the change in the capital stock. It may be assumed that the bias toward exports
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itselfat least partly a reaction to earlier changes in relative prices in favor of The Philippine
exports. usedin
ports. The fact
SOUTH KOREA some inferences
South Korea's rapid export growth began early in the 1960s, and the real stimulating exp
export EER was sustained by subsidies between devaluations. Frank, Kim, and Baldwin ex
Westphal found, however, a significant difference in the responsiveness of cx- ports and then
ports when there were changes in the exchange rate itself and when there were happened to exi
changes in subsidies.2' Their estimate of the elasticity of manufactured exports ports throughoi
with respect to the exchange rate was 2.14, while that with respect to subsidies fluenced by U.:
was 0.95. This result suggests that exchange rate changes themselves had more sitive to exchan
effect than did comparable increases in the export EER achieved throughex- results indicate
port subsidies. plicable to
The authors also noted that reduced risk associated with exporting may more annually
have spurred export growth after 1963, and that the responsiveness of exports ports had been
"changed sharply" after this date. However, in both cases the period was too estimated aver
short for separate estimation. This shift, like others in Brazil and Colombia, percent). Makii
probably represents the longer-term response that may be explained by a Baldwin conclu
number of factors; an adequate real export exchange rate is a necessary, but tive exchange




Philippine exports rose from an annual average of about $550 million in
1959-1962 to about $850 million in 1963-1966. After making adjustments for After the
over- and underreporting and for changes in sugar exports (which depended on low of $247 mi]
American quotas), Baldwin estimated that this represented a 53 percent in- 1961 and then 1
creasein export earnings in response to the 1960-1962 liberalization. The most annual rate of
significant shift in production was that in the agricultural sector, in which land growth in the p
was shifted to commercial export crops from food crops for domestic con- again boomed,
sumption. However, the rate of growth of manufactured exports also rose $677 million in
sharply—from 8.5 percent in the late 1950s to 14.6 percent in the mid-1960s tinued over the
(exclusive of coconut products).22 toforeign
remittances.
Despite these apparently impressive results, Baldwin did not pronounce Estimates
the 1960-1962 Phase III an unqualified success: dicated thatr
significance of
In a sense, the decontrol episode was partly successful in changing the production incen- supply
tives built into the economy during the 1950s despite the intentions of the government, and 0.81 for rn
But the resulting situation was not very satisfactory from an economic standpoint, since response was ze
a significant liberalization effort that could have established the basis for a new type of insignificant.
export-oriented growth was not achieved. . . responseswereINTERMEDIATE-TERM RESPONSES 197
The Philippine experience is one of the strong pieces of evidence that will be
used in evaluating the long-run determinants of trend rates of growth of ex-
ports. The fact that liberalization occurred without bias reduction permits
some inferences to be drawn as to the relative importance of these factors in
stimulating export growth.
Baldwin examined export supply functions for a number of Philippine ex-
ports and then used the resulting elasticity estimates to ask what would have
happened to export earnings had realistic exchange rates been applicable to ex-
ports throughout the period. His estimates omitted sugar, which is strongly in-
fluenced by U.S. quotas, and coconut products, which are apparently insen-
sitive to exchange rate changes and were thus assumed to remain constant. The
results indicate that, had the essential producer-goods exchange rate been ap-
plicable to exports, exports would have averaged $116 million (or 20 percent)
more annually than they in fact did over the 1950-1969 period. If, instead, ex-
ports had been accorded the EER for semi-essential consumer goods, the
estimated average annual increase would have been $188 million (or 33
percent). Making the qualifications that must always surround such estimates,
Baldwin concluded that "not only has export growth been retarded by effec-
tive exchange rates that discriminated against the export sector, but export ex-
pansion has been hampered by the import-substitution program, since this has
artificially inflated the prices of some inputs used by the export sector."24
TURKEY
After the 1958 Turkish devaluation, export earnings jumped from their
low of $247 million to $363 million in 1959. They remained at that level until
1961 and then began growing, fairly steadily until about 1967, at an average
annual rate of 7 percent. This contrasts sharply with their negative rate of
growth in the predevaluation period. After the 1970 devaluation, exports once
again boomed, rising from $537 million in 1969 to $588 million in 1970 and
$677 million in 1971. Rapid growth, especially of nontraditional exports, con-
tinued over the next several years. That growth, however, contributed far less
toforeign exchange earnings than did the rapid growth of workers'
remittances.
Estimates of the response of Turkish exports to changes in real EER5 in-
dicated that responsiveness varied from commodity to commodity; the
significance of the estimates also varied among commodities. The estimated
supply elasticity was 5 for olive oil, 3 for mohair, just about unity for cotton,
and 0.81 for minor exports. For tobacco, chrome, and copper, the estimated
response was zero or slightly negative, although the estimates were statistically
insignificant.Interestingly enough, commodities having positive supply
responses were those for which changes in the EER were passed on to pro-
ces in favor of
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ducers; the commodities with apparent zero or negative supply elasticities were In many in
those for which real EER changes did not necessarily get reflected in domestic respond" becau
prices because of domestic price intervention policies. That finding again rein- centives to expo
forces the dictum that knowledge of internal policies and conditions is impor- devaluation did
tant in predicting the effect of exchange rate changes. porarily;
levels; Colombi
devaluations th
Generalizations from the Country Studies of doubtful dir
real EERs for e
Several characteristics of the individual country findings stand out sharply." South Korea's
Perhaps most striking is the fact that virtually all authors believed there were toward the
significant responses to changes in real EERs. While the usual qualifications between devalu
were made about the estimates, there is not one instance where doubt was ex- The eviden
pressed about the responsiveness of exports to real EERs. Of course, account follows exchanj
must be taken of the difference between nominal and effective exchange rates of magnitude o
and also of export subsidies and incentives for exports, including the effect of rates is certaini
domestic policies. dicate. Yet tho
The intermediate-term response of exports seems to have been forthcom- gains from
ing fairly quickly.If an expectations model of producer behavior were substantial, th
postulated, it is not at all obvious why exports should respond in a country itself—would g
such as Chile, where the virtual certainty was that the real export rate would of the sort that
quickly become less attractive. Yet even in those environments the response Korea, as well
was there, and it was fairly sizable. The intermediate-term response seems to
have enabled export earnings to increase within a period of six to eighteen
months after devaluation—probably a shorter period than a prioriexpecta- Th Se arate E tions might have suggested. The supply of exports for such relatively quick
eP
reactions must have been largely diverted from existing productive capacity or
stocks to the export market; it is doubtful that significant shifts in crop pat- From the evidei
terns or in manufacturing capacity could have occurred within that short a there was signil
time period, rate for export
The responses of nontraditional exports to Phase III changes were usually regardless of w
stronger than those of traditional exports. But with the exceptions of coffee in ther liberalizati
Brazil and Columbia and coconut products and sugar in the Philippines, export earnings
authors of country studies believed that the real export rate has been a signifi- returned to the
cant deterrent to traditional exports. Behrman and Leith believe that the treat- What is
ment accorded Chilean copper and Ghanaian cocoa by the trade and payments bias and by libe
regime did adversely affect earnings. There are so many exogenous factors af- usually followe
fecting export earnings from traditional commodities that systematic analysis of these factors
of the role of the real exchange rate was seldom possible, but it is noteworthy country's dolla
that, by and large, earnings from traditional exports generally increased in the to that countrr
period of several years following devaluations. as cross-sectionINTERMEDIATE-TERM RESPONSES 199
In many instances the evidence strongly indicates that "exports did not
respond" because there was nothing to respond to. The lack of improved in-
centives to export characterized a large number of episodes: the first Brazilian
devaluation did not improve export incentives, and the second did so only tem-
porarily; Chilean and Ghanaian real EERs quickly returned to their former
levels; Colombian minor exports were generally treated less favorably after
devaluations than before; the change in incentives to Indian exports was really
of doubtful direction and magnitude; Israel's second devaluation saw lower
real EERs for exports a year afterward than had prevailed a year before; and
South Korea's formal exchange rate changes tended to raise import EERs
toward the export rate because the latter was maintained by export subsidies
between devaluations.
The evidence that "exchange rates matter," at least when devaluation
follows exchange controls, therefore seems fairly strong. The probable order
of magnitude of the losses from inappropriate (and fluctuating) real export
rates is certainly significant, as estimates provided by Baldwin and others in-
dicate. Yet those estimates pertain primarily to the intermediate run. While
gains from maintaining appropriate real exchange rates might have been
substantial, the evidence also strongly suggests that such a policy—by
itself—would generally not have resulted in rapid and sustained export growth
of the sort that was experienced over the longer run by Brazil, Israel, South
Korea, as well as by Colombian minor exports.
The Separate Effects of the Components of Phase III
From the evidence presented in the country studies, it is clear that in most cases
there was significant responsiveness to Phase III changes in the real exchange
rate for exports in the several following years. This seems to have been so
regardless of whether there was a sustained period of export growth and fur-
ther liberalization in the longer run or whether Phase II again emerged because
export earnings were inadequate to sustain liberalization or export PLD-EERs
returned to their former levels.
What is not immediately evident is the separate role played by reduced
bias and by liberalization in bringing about the increase in export earnings that
usually followed Phase III. A model designed to identify the individual effects
of these factors has been constructed. 26Thebasic approach is to regard each
country's dollar value of exports as growing over time at a trend rate specific
to that country; changes in the real export rate and the phases are then treated
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THE MODEL
Apparently the long-term rate of growth of exports is a function of a
number of variables. The determinants of that rate are discussed in the final
section of this chapter. Here, concern is with the deviations of export earnings
from their trend. The trend rate of growth of export earnings in each country
is taken simply as a function of time. Alternative hypotheses can then be tested
with respect to the influence of various phenomena surrounding Phase III.
These hypotheses are: (1) in addition to the effect of the real export EER, ex-
port earnings are affected by the extent of liberalization; (2) export earnings
are greater in Phases IV and V than in I and II (with or without adjustment for
real EER behavior); and (3) export earnings grow faster in Phases IV and V
than in I and II.
The model can most easily be regarded as having two parts. First, it is
assumed that each country's exports grow at a particular rate, r1, and that this
trend rate is determined by factors outside the model. Then deviations from
the trend rate are treated as functions of the country's real export rate and of
the phases of the trade and payments regime. However, it proves simplest to
estimate the entire model in a single step, as in the following equation:28
log =a0,+ g log + r4t ÷ a1d1t + a2d2t + a3d3
+ a4d4 + u,(t) (9.1)
where X1(t)the ith country's dollar export earnings of traditional or non-
traditional exports at time t;andd,, andj= 1,--., 4denote dummy
(u1(t)) variables. These variables assume the following values:
a. on the trend:
b. on the constant:
d —1,inPhasesland II
0, in all otheE phases
d —1,in Phases IV and V
2 —0,in all other phases
d —1,in Phases I and II
—0,in all other phases
d —1,in Phases IV and V
—0,in all other phases
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commodities separately) for the ith country; r1 =thetrend rate of growth of
the ith country; 1= time;u1(1) denotes a random disturbance term, which it is
assumed to be uncorrelated, with zero mean and constant variance. The terms
a01, a,, a2, a3, and a4, I =1, ..,10 are parameters to be estimated; note that
a01, having the subscript i, is different for every country.
The hypothesis that exports depend on both the real exchange rate and the
phase of the trade and payments regime has two alternative interpretations. In
one, exports might fall below their trend level during Phases I and II and rise
above it in Phases IV and V. In the other, exports might grow at a slower rate
than their long-term trend during Phases I and II, and at a faster rate during
IV and V. The signs and significance of the parameters, a,,a3 and a4, test
this hypothesis; if growth rates are affected, a1 and a2 should be significantly
different from zero.2'
In this model the real export rate is taken as a proxy for the bias of the
trade and payments regime: a higher real export rate is taken to mean lower
bias. Such an association is not perfect but is the best that can be made.
Moreover, the evidence strongly suggests that, within a particular country,
changes in the real export rate are strongly correlated with the regime's chang-
ing bias toward exports.
The separate significance of liberalization and bias reduction can then be
tested in this model. If the bias of the regime is all that counts, the dummy
variables should not be significant. If liberalization, and not bias, affects ex-
ports, the dummies should be significant and the coefficient on the real EER
should not be. There are degrees of liberalization, of course, and the fact that
only three possible states are allowed for (Phases I and H, Phases IV and V,
and the no-dummy state-Phase III) makes the dummy measure highly im-
perfect.3° In the absence of better data, however, dummy variables are all that
is available to reflect the state of liberalization. And, while there can be more
or less liberalization within a phase in a particular country, or in one country
than another, it nonetheless seems likely that the changes in liberalization bet-
ween periods in Phases I and II, on one hand, and IV and V on the other,
should be large enough so that dummy variables ought to be sufficient to test
for the significance of liberalization, if not necessarily for the magnitude of its
impact.
THE DATA
The regression equation was estimated separately for traditional and non-
traditional exports. The data requirements, therefore, were: (1) the PLD-
EERs for traditional and nontraditional exports; (2) the dollar value of tradi-
tional and nontraditional exports; and (3) the timing of the phases. The first202 LONGER-TERM RESPONSE TO PHASE Ill
two data sets were given in Tables 9-1 through 9-4, and the last was itemized in
Chapter 2.
Inspection of the data in Tables 9-1 and 9-2 points up an omission from
the model which is probably significant: the magnitude of fluctuations in ex-
port PLD-EERs has varied widely from country to country and from time to
time. Both Behrman and found the variance in the real exchange rate to
be an important explanatory variable for the behavior of exports. A second
feature unaccounted for in the model is that, for the most part, nontraditional
exports have been exposed to smaller fluctuations in the real exchange rate
than have traditional exports. The reason, of course, is that export subsidies
and incentives have been applied much more quickly to nontraditional than to
traditional exports during Phase II. Thus, between devaluations the real ex-
change rate for traditional exports has eroded much more, on average, than
that for nontraditional exports.
The dollar values of exports of traditional and nontraditional exports are
given for each country in Tables 9-3 and should be noted that South
Korea has an insignificant amount of exports that can be classified as tradi-
tional, so total South Korean exports are given only in Table 9-4. Using export
earnings as a dependent variable is a theoretically valid procedure only when
the countries under consideration are sufficiently small so that their behavior
does not affect the prices at which they sell their exports.32 Whenever a country
has monopoly power in trade, that assumption is not appropriate, and the
determinants of export earnings are properly estimated by means of
simultaneous equations in which the domestic supply of exportables and
foreign demand jointly determine price and quantity in each market. Failure to
use that procedure results in a downward bias in the estimate of export respon-
siveness to altered real EERs.
For nontraditional exports, the "small country" assumption is surely ap-
propriate for the countries covered, with the possible exceptions of Brazil,
Israel, and South Korea in the late 1960s. Even in these cases, monopoly power
must have been very small, so the resulting bias in the estimates presented here
is neglible. For traditional exports, however, the problem may be more signifi-
cant: Chilean copper, Brazilian and Colombian coffee, Egyptian cotton (if
data for Egypt were available), and Ghanaian cocoa are the main cases where
it is difficult to believe that there is not some monopoly power in trade.33 For
that reason it is likely that the true "supply" response of traditional exports to
altered EERs may be greater than is estimated here.
There is yet another factor which may qualify this model's results: the
dollar prices for some of the commodities exported fluctuated significantly
over the period. This factor was highly significant for Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
and Ghana, and it affects the estimates for traditional, more than nontradi-
tional, exports. However, except insofar as fluctuations in export prices were
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is no reason why
coefficients of the variables should be affected—it would simply increase the
unexplained variance. Of course, if a reduced foreign price resulted in a lower
volume being supplied for export, or forced a devaluation and a higher real ex-
port rate, estimates would be biased downward.
All the qualifications, therefore, suggest that the estimates must be inter-
preted with care and may be subject to some bias—probably downward. It
would appear that the bias is likely to be greater for traditional than for non-
traditional exports.
RESULTS
Table 9-6 gives estimates of the basic trend coefficients. Little needs to be
said about them, except perhaps to note that Chilean export data are not
available before 1960 and the high growth rate for traditional exports for that
country reflects the rising price of minerals from the low 1960base;the Egyp-
tian rate of growth of traditional exports is also largely a price phenomenon.
Otherwise the rates reflect what was already known: Brazil, Israel, and South
Table 9-6.Estimated Coefficients for Export Earnings Model, Ten Countries
Country Period
TraditionalExports Non traditionaI Exports

















Colombia 1954.72 6.20 —.01 4.03 .05

















































Turkey 1954-72 5.15 .03 4.43 .06
(69.1) (5.4) (21.7) (3.5)
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.204 LONGER-TERM RESPONSE TO PHASE lii
Korea enjoyed remarkably rapid growth of exports, with the Brazilian growth Table 9-7.Esti,
being concentrated in nontraditional commodities in the late 1960s. Colombia, Exchange Rates
Ghana, and India had extremely slow growth, although Colombia's growth of
nontraditional exportsis more impressive; and the other countriesfall
somewhere in between the two extremes.
The purpose of estimating trends was to use deviations from them for in-
vestigating the influence of real EERs and the extent of liberalization in accor-
Traditional Exportc
dance with Equation (9.1). The results are reported in Table 9-7. The expOrt
Dummy on constan
PLD-EER turned out to be a highly significant explanatory variable for non- Dum tdb
traditional exports, despite the fact that it is deviations around the trend that
my Oflren
are at issue and also despite the downward bias inherent in the estimates.34 In
contrast with the relatively large response of nontraditional exports, tradi-
Nontraditional Expor
tional exports do not appear to have responded systematically to changes in
Dummy on constan
their real exchange rate. This probably reflects: (1) the downward bias in the
- . Dummyon trend
estimating procedure; (2) the influence of price fluctuations in determining the
dollar value of export earnings for traditional exports; and (3) the greater
Numbers m
themarket to prevent changes in the a"
PLD-EER for traditional exports being passed on to producers. b"
on constai
The response of nontraditional export earnings to increases in the PLD-
Dummy on trend
EER for exports is sizable. It would imply, for example, that a devaluation
that increases the export EER by 50 percent and is followed by a 20 percent in-
crease in domestic prices should result in an increase of approximately 36 per- Given the ci
cent in earnings from nontraditional exports in addition to whatever trend rate analysis further.
of increase is being experienced. This tends to reconfirm the results reported in even in situations
the Colombian, South Korean, Turkish, and other studies: nontraditional ex- will revert to its
ports seem to have been remarkably responsive to exchange rate changes. intermediate run.
The phases do not appear to be a significant variable except for tradi- reflected in these
tional exports, and then only for Phases IV and V when the dummy variable is Nonetheless, the
on the constant term. Despite the significance of that term, the implied emerge from the
magnitude of the export response is very small: exports would be expected to be is bias reduction
about 0.11 percent above the level predicted using time as the only variable which brings abc
during Phases IV and V. However, even in that estimate, the sign associated
with the dummy for Phases I and II is different from that hypothesized, so the
prediction that there is any significant difference in exports, either traditional Foreign Exchang
or nontraditional, between Phases I and II and IV and V is not supported by
this test, once account is taken of real EERs. Export earnings
To the extent that reliance can be placed upon these results, it would ap- changes in foreig
pear that it is the bias of the regime, more than QRs, which retards the growth all but exception
of exports. If QRs retarded exports, other than through an overvalued real Generally the mt
EER, it should show up in a difference in the behavior of exports between from devaluatior
Phases I and II and Phases IV and V. While the test is rather crude, the fact ings. There were
that the results are insignificant in all but one case, and are very small even speculative flows
then, suggests that it is factors other than the phases themselves that determine run. Likewise tht
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Table 9.7.Estimated Coefficient of Response of Export Earnings to Real



























Dummyon constanta 1.32 —.04 .08 3863 .998 1.31








Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
a" Dummy on constant" coefficients are a3 and a4 in Equation (9.1).
b"Dummy on trend" coefficients are a1 and a2 in Equation (9.1).
Given the crudeness of the data and the test, it is difficult to take the
analysis further. For whatever it is worth, however, the results suggest that,
even in situations where there is every reason to expect that the real export rate
will revert to its former level, raising it generates a significant response in the
intermediate run. The findings of the individual country studies are, of course,
reflected in these results, so they cannot be treated as independent evidence.
Nonetheless, the results of this analysis tend to reinforce the impressions that
emerge from the individual country studies and, in addition, to suggest that it
is bias reduction, to a considerably greater extent than it is liberalization,
which brings about export response.
Foreign Exchange Receipts Other Than from Exports
Export earnings and their growth have provided the predominant source of
changes in foreign exchange receipts for the countries included in the project in
all but exceptional cases, such as South Korea in the mid-1950s, and Israel.
Generally the intermediate-term changes in foreign exchange receipts resulting
from devaluation and liberalization episodes have been changes in export earn-
ings. There were instances, reported in Chapter 8, where reversals of earlier
speculative flows resulted in a spurt of foreign exchange receipts in the short
run. Likewise there are cases, such as in Brazil and South Korea, where private
foreign capital flows began growing rapidly in response to the change in the206 LONG-TERM RESPONSE TO PHASE III
trade and payments regime. In the intermediate run, however,' there are few
nonexport sources of foreign exchange that appear to have changed
systematicallY and significantly with the phases of the regime or the real ex-
change rate.
Even in the rare instances of responses by other foreign exchange sources,
the total magnitudes are not large relative to the impact of devaluation and
liberalization on export earnings. Behrman, for example, reports a significant
price elasticity for service exports—such as tourism—and also that net direct
investment flows were significantly greater in Phase IV periods than in restric-
tive periods." Even then the absolute effect is small in comparison to the effect
of altering export EERs by a like proportion. Tourism—the component of
foreign exchange receipts that might be expected to be most responsive to the
real exchange rate in the intermediate run—did not change dramatically, part-
ly because the real rate was maintained between devaluations and partly
because the countries covered by the project are not major tourist destinations.
The only exception to the relatively small magnitude of changes in other
sources of foreign exchange occurred in Turkey; after the Turkish devaluation
of 1970, workers' remittances emerged as a very large item in Turkey's balance
of payments. From 1965 on there had been a large number of Turkish workers
in Western Europe and their remittances had become a significant element in
the Turkish balance of payments, rising from $7 million in 1965 to $141
million in 1969. These were partly induced by a special workers' remittance
rate and by privileges accorded to returning workers in return for their earlier
deposits of foreign currency in the central bank. Nonetheless, some workers'
savings were held in marks and other Western European currencies, and some
response after devaluation was anticipated. The magnitude of the initial
response—$273 million in 1970 alone, with devaluation taking place only in
August of that year—was not surprising; it was regarded as a once-and-for-all
transfer of accumulated workers' savings in response to the new exchange rate.
The 1971 and 1972 net remittances, however, increased markedly: to $471
million in 1971 and $740 million in 1972. Growth continued during the next
two years, and workers' remittances offset larger trade account deficits.
Turkey's proximity to Europe makes the interdependence of many transac-
tions greater than for developing countries that are more remote from the in-
dustrialized world, but there was certainly no expectation of such a large
response of workers' remittances to devaluation., While the initial transfer of
funds was anticipated, there was no basis upon which sustained growth of that
account could have been forecast.
II. LONG-TERM RESPONSE TO PHASE III
There were twenty-two Phase III episodes covered by the ten country. studies,
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have been followed by sustained liberalization. Merely counting Phase III
episodes is deceptive. Successful liberalizations will, by definition, not be
followed by further Phase Ills, whereas the failures will likely be followed by
other attempts to liberalize the regime at a later date. On the other hand,
devaluation per se does not necessarily signify that a Phase III episode is oc-
curring. Devaluing countries are not regarded as being in Phase III if they had
not previously been using QRs to contain balance-of-payments deficits. Brazil
devalued repeatedly after 1967, but alteration of QRs was not at issue. Colom-
bia, too, has changed her exchange rate frequently since her last Phase III
episode in 1967. Israel has had several devaluations since 1962, and South
Korea has alternated between periods of floating rates and formal devalua-
tions.
Rather than concluding that only four of the twenty-two Phase Ill
episodes were successful, it is more meaningful to say that four of the ten
countries succeeded in making a sustained transition to Phases IV and V.36
Either way, there remains an important question: What led to the rapid export
growth experienced by the four countries which abandoned QRs? In the
preceding section, it was the intermediate-term, response of exports that was
the subject of inquiry; here the question focuses upon the contribution of the
Phase III episodes to the longer-term rapid growth of exports in the four coun-
tries.
Contrasts in Long-Run Export Performance
The analysis of the country authors tells most of the story. It will be recalled
that the change in the trade and payments regime in Brazil in 1964 was follow-
ed by several years of good export earnings, but that it was not until the policy
shift of 1967 that exports started their sustained and rapid growth. In Colom-
bia the rapid growth of minor exports was prolonged, and devaluations were
an occasion to unify exchange rates and reduce the bias toward minor exports,
which had been buffered from the declining real EER between devaluations.
In Israel, export growth faltered in the mid-l960s until a policy of maintaining
the real export rate was adopted. In South Korea, rapid export growth started
before 1964; devaluations were used, as in Colombia, to unify exchange rates,
and between devaluations export subsidies and special privileges to exporters
maintained incentives.
By way of contrast, consider the experiences of some of the other coun-
tries: (1) Behrman considers that Chile's devaluations always left an (increas-
ingly) overvalued rate; (2) India's devaluation was only large enough to absorb
most of the premium on import licenses as long as the recession lasted; and
(3) Baldwin considers that the Philippines only partly benefited from the
1960-1962 liberalization because there were insufficient incentives for an
export-led expansion.208 LONGER-TERM RESPONSE TO PHASE 111
All the "success" stories involve not only a lack of bias toward import
substitution but also positive incentives for export. In addition they involve a
government commitment to sustaining the export drive, so that it is not only at
times of formal exchange rate changes that incentives are attractive to ex-
porters. All the evidence (and theory) points to the conclusion that maintain-
ing a sufficiently high real exchange rate and providing an environment in
which producers can expect this commitment to continue are necessary condi-
tions for rapid export growth.
THE BRAZILIAN TRANSFORMATION
The best evidence is supplied by the Brazilian case. During the
three years before the export push started, the real export EER was not much
different from that in later years. Fishlow reported that, as late as 1967, "ex-
port pessimism" still pervaded official thinking:
The Piano Decenalpublishedin 1967 was considered bold—and incorrect—for
its assumption that exports would grow at a rate of 8.5 percent until 1970
(although only 3 percent thereafter).... Officialoptimism regarding Brazilian
growth prospects is relatively recent, and ex post."
Starting late in 1967, however, incentives began changing. The crawling-peg
exchange rate was introduced in 1968, and legislation was passed guaranteeing
exporters "subsidy credits based on the industrial excise tax." Individual
states began exempting agricultural exports from their sales taxes, which were
levied at rates of 15 to 35 percent. Credit facilities for exporters were also
significantly increased. Fishlow summarizes the net change in incentives by
calculating the maximum price differential at which domestic and export sales
would return the same rate of profit and by calculating the profit differential
that would accrue for the same selling price. His results are reproduced in
Table 9-8.
The first column of Table 9-8 gives the differential in price that would
have been required to equalize the profit rates on foreign and on domestic
sales. As can be seen, export-promotion measures began in 1964, but they did
not begin providing large incentives for exporting until 1967 and 1968. By that
time, exporters could earn the same profit in the foreign market as they could
in the domestic market if their price abroad was 80 percent of their domestic
price. The difference in profitability between selling abroad and at home was
only 2 to 3 percent until 1968; thereafter, in 1970 and 1971, it rose to 25 per-
cent.
Fishlow estimated export supply functions for periods before and after












in the case o














there was a favor
to encourage exp





factors, perhapias toward import
ion they involve a






ER was not much















964, but they did
nd 1968. By that
ket as they could
)f their domestic
tnd at home was
rose to 25per-
before and after
LONG-TERM RESPONSE TO PHASE III





(domestic price to foreign
price ratio)
Profit Differential
on Sales at Same Price
(difference between foreign










Source: Fishlow, Table XXI.
• .. inthe case of manufactures, also, and despite the inclusion of substantial in-
centives in the exchange rate, price elasticities are only part of the story. The total
context within which exchange rate changes occur is equally central. After 1964,
but especially 1968, a new strategy of progressively opening the economy became
apparent to all. Incentives were provided in sufficient magnitude to overcome in-
itial inertia and lack of information. In such circumstances, production for sale
abroad could become a regular and profitable activity.
Brazil's conversion to export status has thus required, and received, more
than favorable manipulation of foreign prices relative to domestic. It has involved
nothing less than a complete realignment of development strategy that has pro-
vided the same assurances of policy consistency that the import substitution im-
petus of the 1950's satisfied. One cannot stress such certainty and commitment
too strongly)8
SOUTH KOREA
Evidence from South Korea is surprisingly similar: it was not only that
there was a favorable export rate but also that the government was committed
to encourage exports. Frank, Kim, and Westphal found that South Korean ex-
ports were very responsive to exchange rate changes (although their statistical
results were conditional because the degrees of freedom were too small). Their
conclusions, however, stressed other factors as well as the exchange rate:
The rapid growth of South Korea's exports cannot be explained simply in terms
of those incentives subject to quantitative measurement. Other very important
factors, perhaps even more important, are the government's attitudes and210 LONGER-TERM RESPONSE TO PHASE III
methods of operating.... Withan atmosphere in which businessmen are certain
that government will reward efforts to export, itis relatively easy to take the
substantial risks of expanding production and capacity for export markets. A
businessman cannot only expect tangibte rewards for export performance, but
knows that if he runs into financial difficulties, the government will provide some
form of special treatment to help him out of his troubles.
ISRAEL
Israel's export growth was very rapid, although less so than that in Brazil
and South Korea. Israel was omitted from the Table 6-2 summary of bias
changes because itis one of the countries where no premium-inclusive
estimates of the bias of the regime are available. Michaely did provide
estimates of export and import EERs, however. Taking the ratio of the export
EER to the premium-exclusive import EER is not conclusive, but—combined
with the knowledge that Israel's reliance upon QRs was diminishing almost
continuously after 1952—it is sufficient to be confident that a shift in bias oc-
curred.
Israel had a regime rather heavily biased toward import substitution in the
early 1950s, and that bias was substantially reduced, if not even slightly revers-
ed, by the early l970s. The export and import EERs, exclusive of import
premiums,4° were very close to the same level from 1951 to 1960, but that is the
period when QRs were employed to provide protection to import-competing
industries. Even in the 1950s, however, there were numerous devices through
which the Israeli government promoted exports. While export-promotion
measures were not as visible as in Brazil, the government does seem to have
given exporters assurance that profitability would be maintained. From the
devaluation of 1962 until 1969, the import EER was above that for exports,
but that was the period when premiums were declining.
Michaely weighs the available evidence in some detail and believes that,
on balance, there was some bias toward import substitution, although the
situation varied from industry to industry because exports of textiles, leather
products, and other light industries were protected by about the same amount
as were the same products destined for the domestic market.4From
Michaely's discussion it is hard to believe that bias toward import substitution
could have been very marked. Maintenance of the real exchange rate and the
continuous reduction in bias toward import substitution undoubtedly played a
substantial role in Israel's rapid export growth.
COLOMBIA
Colombia's success is somewhat different from that of Brazil, Israel, and
South Korea. Rapid growth was confined to minor exports; their growth
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the responsiveness of minor exports to alterations in the real export rate were
reproduced in Table 9-5.Henoted that the constant term was large and signifi-
cant, implying that much of the growth rate was due to factors other than the
exchange rate.42 He concluded that it was the export-promotion schemes that
were significant. These schemes went well beyond maintaining the real ex-
change rate and involved an intangible element:
Especially since 1967, the many instruments of the Colombian government have
been increasingly tilted in favor of exporters of products other than coffee or oil.
Credit, besides that from PROEXPO or aimed at specific exportable crops, is
channeled preferentially.... Theencouragement given to exporters has also
stimulated the granting of foreign credit to them. Entrepreneurs are notified both
formally and informally that the fate of their requests regarding import licenses,
release from price controls, or of any other request having to do with any field
where public-sector action is important—and there are few where that action is
not—will very much depend on their export record. The medals and banners
regularly presented by the Colombian President to distinguished exporters, in
other words, are not simply moral incentives, for they give the recipients some
muscle when dealing with the numerous public agencies capable of making the
life of businessmen either easy or miserable and profitable or unprofitable.43
DIaz concluded that measurement of the impact of these programs is probably
not feasible, but that they are of considerable importance.
THREE PROTOTYPES
While all generalizations are subject to debate, it seems possible to
characterize three types of regime on the basis of their export-response ex-
periences. On one hand, there are regimes with a realistic exchange rate and
domestic policies designed to make exporting profitable. Second, there are
regimes with a realistic exchange rate, in which most incentives within the
economy are still geared toward the profitability of import substitution. Final-
ly, there are the regimes in which the overvaluation of the exchange rate means
that significantly less is exported than would be at a realistic exchange rate.
The countries that experienced sustained rapid growth of export earnings
over the longer term seem to have had a number of things in common. First,
they had a realistic exchange rate—a necessary condition for sustained and
rapid export growth. The level of the exchange rate, and not its rate of change,
appears to have been significant. In Brazil the real export rate seems to have
been higher in the early and mid-1960s than it was later on; it was only after
1967 that the crawling peg provided relative certainty with regard to the future
real exchange rate. In Colombia, likewise, the real rate for minor exports was
relatively more constant than that for other classes of commodities, but the ex-
port boom, which started in 1967, was accompanied by a crawling pegand a212 LONGER-TERM RESPONSE TO PHASE III
great reduction in the variation of the real exchange rate. South Korea, too,
has maintained a realistic exchange rate and has altered the nominal rate ac-
cording to changes in the domestic price level. Israel's PLD-EER for exports
has also been relatively stable since the late l950s.
But maintaining a realistic real exchange rate is clearly not enough to
generate the sort of export performance that Brazil, Colombia, Israel, and
South Korea have had. In all four cases, export-promotion policies have made
expansion of export markets profitable and secure. The types of incentives
given in other countries for import substitution were extended to exporters in
the rapid-growth countries. Perhaps the clearest-cut case of a country main-
taining a more-or-less realistic exchange rate but failing to provide sufficient
incentives for export is the Philippines. There, as Baldwin reported, the ex-
change control apparatus was completely dismantled, but the profitability of
producing for export was inadequate and a period of stagnation followed the
devaluation. Turkey is another country whose experience appears to have con-
formed to this pattern, at least from 1958 to about the mid-1960s. The Turkish
exchange rate was not significantly overvalued, and export earnings grew at a
moderate rate. Few new resources went into export industries, however; they
were pulled into import substitution by the bias of the regime and by the cer-
tainty and security that prohibition of competing imports provided. It would
thus appear that even though countries have realistic exchange rates, a distinc-
tion must be made between those that are oriented toward export promotion
and those that are not.
There is also a group of countries whose exchange rates are chronically
overvalued and export earnings are falling or growing at best very slowly. In
the NBER project, those countries include Chile, Ghana, India, and Turkey
prior to 1958 (also Brazil in the 1950s). In those cases, overvaluation of the ex-
change rate appears to have been extreme and to have prevented any possibili-
ty of satisfactory export performance except under very fortuitous cir-
cumstances.44 Export earnings depended almost entirely on the performance
of traditional exports and the few import-substituting industries that were pro-
vided with some inducement to export.
The evidence from the country studies and the statistical analysis of the
country authors both highlight the fact that exports, both traditional and non-
traditional, have been much more adversely affected by overvalued exchange
rates than has generally been recognized. It seems evident that countries which
have maintained significantly overvalued exchange rates have incurred sizable
losses, both because of the level of the real rate and also because of fluctua-
tions in it. Baldwin's calculations for the Philippines, Behrman's estimates for
Chile, and Leith's evidence for Ghana all point to the sizable gains that might
have been made had exchange rates been set at realistic levels and maintained
there.
Maintaining a highly overvalued exchange rate can be thought of as
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into import-substitution industries, or else there is relative stagnation and slow
growth. When there is a strong bias toward import substitution and an enor-
mous incentive to produce for the domestic market when imports are
unavailable, it is useless to inquire whether import substitution results from
the pull of the domestic market or thç push away from exporting activities.
When a realistic exchange rate is set in a Phase III episode, there is a
sizable intermediate-term export response. That response consists primarily of
shifting output from existing productive capacity toward the export market,
but no comparable shift of investment toward export-oriented industries oc-
curs. Entrepreneurs and producers do not build capacity based on the export
market to any significant extent, but unutilized capacity can be employed to
produce for export, cropping patterns can be shifted, and some part of pro-
duction may be diverted from domestic consumption to exporting. This "ex-
isting capacity" sort of exporting characterized Brazil between 1964 and 1967,
and it seems to account for many of the spurts in minor exports that follow
devaluations in other countries.
While rapid export growth does not result simply from setting a realistic
exchange rate, the gains from "existing capacity" exporting (compared to per-
mitting a highly overvalued exchange rate) should not be underestimated. The
possibility of exporting may induce entrepreneurs to build larger size plants
than they otherwise would with the expectation that they can export until the
domestic market grows enough to absorb their output. The amount of such
temporary excess-capacity exports can increase over time. In addition, there
do appear to be some primary commodities whose supply is responsive to a
realistic exchange rate, so that the total result can be a significant and sustain-
ed increase in the level of exports contrasted with what would happen with
greater currency overvaluation.
What apparently is necessary for rapid and sustained export growth is
both a realistic exchange rate and profitability sufficient to induce new
resources to enter export industries. That seems to require the same types of
assurances to new export-oriented entrepreneurs as import prohibitions and
similar measures provide under an import-substitution strategy. In economies
where government interventions and permissions pervade virtually ever aspect
of economic activity, it would appear that the intangible kinds of changes in
profit prospects that result from "commitment" on the part of the govern-
ment can be substantial, and they may be necessary to provide sufficient incen-
tives to pull new resources into exporting activities.
Relative Importance of the Various Components
of PhaseIII /
At the outset the task was to determine how bias reduction, liberalization,
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contribute to the longer-term outcome of a policy shift. Each of these changes
has effects on export earnings and also on other aspects of economic activity.
Here, focus is on their role in affecting foreign-exchange earnings; their im-
pact on the domestic economy and related variables is discussed in Chapters 11
and 12.
All the evidence, both from the individual country studies and from the
statistical analysis, points to the bias of the trade and payments regime as be-
ing the crucial determinant of the level of exports and of their growth. The
three-way characterization of export performance described above really boils
down to the extent and direction of bias of the regime. Countries with highly
overvalued exchange rates will, in the absence of fortuitous circumstances, in-
evitably restrict imports to levels that result in extremely high domestic prices
for import-substitution production, and the bias against exports will result
both from the low relative price received for exports and from the high price
for import substitutes. With a more realistic exchange rate, bias is not as great,
although—as illustrated by both the Philippines and Turkey—it can still be
sizable. Exporting becomes really attractive if the bias toward import substitu-
tion is eliminated and if producers of goods for export are assured of con-
tinued profitability comparable to that achievable in the domestic market.
This conclusion does not imply that liberalization is unimportant. On the
contrary the experience of the countries in the project indicates that quan-
titative restrictions inevitably impart a very high degree of protection to
domestic industries and thus are compatible only with a fairly strong bias
toward import substitution. Whether that bias is simply a consequence of the
premiums on import licenses, or whether it results also from the greater cer-
tainty attaching to domestic production when QRs regulate imports, seems
unanswerable. What does seem clear, however, is that relying upon QRs to
regulate imports is inconsistent with an export-oriented strategy and that,
therefore, liberalization is a necessary condition for the removal of bias
toward import substitution.
Reduction in the variaiice in incentives accorded to individual industries is
important for domestic resource allocation, income distribution, and growth,
but it does not appear to be a central determinant of export performance. In
South Korea, for example, it would appear that there is a great deal of
variance among export industries in the effective protection equivalents of the
subsidies extended to them. In general there is variance in both export-oriented
and import-substitution regimes. To be sure, if the incentives accorded to dif-
ferent activities are sufficiently chaotic, it is likely to result in a price-cost
structure that is incompatible with achieving a competitive export status. It
may well be that QRs result in greater variance in incentives, as well as greater
bias, than occurs with pricing incentives. But while reduction in variance can
yield significant payoffs, it is probably a less crucial factor than bias in affec-
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Considering the role of rationalization of the regime raises somewhat
greater imponderables. It seems evident that a sufficiently ad hoc trade and
payments regime could discourage exports simply by hindering imports,
especially the imported inputs needed for production for export. For that
reason, and also to make producers competitive, it is likely that a minimum
degree of assurance about the likelihood of receiving needed import licenses
within reasonable periods is a necessary condition for satisfactory export per-
formance. Here again, however, it is probably the commitment of the govern-
ment to exporting that is crucial, rather than the precise nature of the regula-
tions governing importing and exporting. If officials are committed to en-
couraging exports and making them profitable, it is likely that the regime will
avoid obstructing them to any significant extent. Conversely, if the govern-
ment is committed to fostering import substitution, it is highly unlikely that ra-
tionalization of the regime, by itself, will improve export prospects to any
significant extent.
In Chapters 11 and 12, consideration will be given to the impact of the
trade and payments regime on economic growth. There, it will be seen that
variance reduction and rationalization can have sizable effects on real income,
and thus may be of considerable importance. In terms of the behavior of ex-
ports, however, it would appear that, given some minimally acceptable level of
rationality of the regime, it is the bias of the regime which is significant in
determining exports. Liberalization is important largely because the intended
or unintended incentives accorded to import substitution under a QR regime
make it highly biased toward import substitution. Liberalization is therefore a
necessary condition for reducing bias, but it is bias that ultimately determines
resource pulls.
NOTES
1. Fishlow, p. 69.
2. The volume of exports increased more than 10 percent from 1958 to 1960, with a 30 per.
cent increase in coffee and cocoa exports. See ibid., p. 30.
3. Ibid., pp. 45b and 45c. Fishlow's estimates of exports supply responses would suggest,
however, that at least a fraction of the increase in exports of nontraditional commodities was at-
tributable to the higher real exchange rate. See his supply equations, Table XXIII, p. 86a.
4. Behrman, p. 174.




9. Behrman's "general equilibrium" estimates of responsiveness show much smaller
magnitudes of response than the "partial equilibrium" estimates reported on here; the reason is
that the general equilibrium estimates take into account the inflation that resulted from devalua.16. Ibid., p. 43.
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andthen used the estimated as the dependent variable in the equation given.
29. In a variant of the same model, separate dummy variables were employed for each of the
five years surrounding devaluation episodes. The procedure was deemed less satisfactory, partly
because there were instances where one devaluation followed another by only two years, as in Col-
ombia, and where two years after devaluation the country was in Phase II again. The results of the
two versions were not dissimilar, however.
30. If changes in export EERs understate the reduction in bias associated with Phase IV, there
is still a problem in interpreting the coefficients of the dummy variables because they might reflect
the unmeasured change in bias.
31. ft should be noted that Egyptian rice and onions are treated as nontraditional exports
under the classification procedure followed (see the sources listed in Table 9-4). That is inap-
propriate, but it does not affect the results given in Table 9-7 because export PLD-EERs for Egypt
were unavailable anyway.
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tions and an improved current account balance. They do not alter the estimate of export respon-
siveness tithe real export rate had been maintained.
10. Behrman, p. 310.
...-
11.Diaz, p.57.
12. D(az considers the problem of associating dollar earnings changes with supply changes to
be relatively unimportant for the period under estimation.
13. See Table 2-14, and the commentary in his text.
14. Hansen and Nashashibi, p. 102.
15. Leith, pp. 44-45. The Ghana manuscript covers events through 1971 and was completed
early in 1973.
Bhagwati and Srinivasan, p. 135.
Michaely, p. 138.
Ibid., pp. 140-41.
Frank, Kim, and Westphal, pp.84-86.
23. Ibid., p. 62.
24. Ibid., p. 138.
25. The often-expressed fear that devaluation adversely affects the terms of trade received no
support from the country studies. In general, authors did not regard terms-of-trade changes as im-
portant enough to warrant discussion, although a few—such as Bhagwati and Srinivasan—ex-
plicitly noted the absence of any adverse impact. See their discussion of the issue on pp. 165-66 of
their volume on India.
26. It is not clear how rationalization of the regime and reduced variance in incentives might
affect export earnings directly. They might, however, significantly affect the growth of real in-
come. That hypothesis is examined, with a similar methodology, in Chapter 11.
27. In many respects it would have been preferable to use "real" export earnings, which
might be the dollar value of those earnings deflated by some world price level. In practice, data for
that purpose were unavailable; however, during the period chosen, 1954-1972, the change in the
world price level was fairly small.
28. Identical results would be obtained if one first estimated:NOTES 217
ateof export respon- 32.This problem is different from the desirability of deflating export earnings by a world
price index, which isprobablynot important for the period covered here.
33. There is also a question as to how great any monopoly power is.
34. In the absence of the PLD-EER variable from the estimating equation, phase dummies
turned out to be significant for Phases IV and V (in raising exports above their trend levels, but not
ith supply changesto in affecting the growth rate). The estimated relations are:
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estimated 50 percent increase in desired services over the same period. See Behrman, pp. 125 and
127.
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37. Fishlow, p. 75.
s of trade received no 38. Ibid., p. 89.
-trade changes as im-
and Srinivasan—ex- 39. Frank, Kim, and Westphal, p. 233.
ssue on pp. 165-66 of 40. There were no premiums on exports because no quantitative restrictions applied to them.
41. Michaely, p. 102.
:e in incentives might 42. p. 69.
se growth of real in- 43. Ibid., p. 62.
11. 44. Chile is a case of extreme good fortune for several years after 1965; the increased price of
earnings, which copper resulted in relatively good export earnings despite the overvaluation of the exchange rate.
In practice, data for
72, the change in the
i given.
loyed for each of the
s satisfactory, partly
'two years, as in Col-
tin. The results of the
with Phase IV, there
use they might reflect
ontraditional exports
e 9-4). That is map-
PLD-EERs for Egypt